Is This Really Necessary? - The Need for a New APA by Vendig, Fred et al.
6 
COMMENTARY 
r IS THIS REALLY NECESSARY? 
The Need for a New APA 
The AP A is an important statute. It 
specifies the ground rules for the opera-
tions of over 100 regulatory agencies. 
Many of those agencies are the subject 
of this publication. The extent to which 
they affect our lives is little understood. 
Political scientists and journalists are 
enamored with the more visible posturing 
of elected officials and the dramatic pro-
nouncements of the judiciary. But it is 
the everyday decisions of our regulatory 
agencies which most affect our lives, 
and it is this forum which is least under-
stood. It is ignored not only by academia 
and the press, but by other political 
institutions as well. The degree of defer-
ence paid to these agencies by courts 
and the legislature is well out of propor-
tion to that quantum which may be 
deserved. 
We have previously commented on 
the need to alter the portion of the APA 
dealing with quasi-legislative rulemaking-
particularly the need to restrict the Office 
of Administrative Law from reversing 
decisions of boards based on an alleged 
lack of "necessity" for the rule, or based 
on ex parte (private) contacts with special 
interests complaining about rules after 
they have received a fair hearing. (See 
CRLR Vol. 8, No. 4 (Fall 1988) at 8.) 
The feature article written by Professor 
Michael Asimow in this issue raises a 
broad panoply of important questions. 
We accept his invitation to begin discus-
sion of APA reform-long overdue-by 
commenting on the current structure of 
adjudicatory discipline proceedings and 
their review. 
The adjudicatory part of the APA 
defines the due process steps necessary 
to discipline a licensee. Let's look at 
how it works now. Normally, an investi-
gation is undertaken by investigators of 
a licensing board ( or of the Department 
of Consumer Affairs). Where there is 
cause for discipline and it cannot be 
resolved through a warning, a formal 
"accusation" is filed under the APA. 
The Act then provides assiduously for 
due process safeguards to protect the 
accused. The right to continue to practice 
as a physician, pharmacist, barber, em-
balmer, dentist, or landscape architect is 
a "vested right" and its suspension or 
revocation is a serious matter. The stat-
ute properly allows for notice of charges, 
filing of an answer, right to discovery, 
right to present evidence, the opportunity 
to be represented by counsel, right to 
confront the witnesses and evidence 
against you, a decision by a finder of 
fact, recording of the proceedings, and 
right to appeal. The burden is on the 
agency to prove violation of its standards 
by "clear and convincing" evidence-
more than the "preponderance of the 
evidence" test in a civil proceeding for 
damages. 
This is all as it should be. But mechanic-
ally, the system runs as follows: 
First, an evidentiary hearing is held 
before a committee of the regulatory 
agency or an administrative law judge 
(ALJ) of the Office of Administrative 
Hearings (OAH). Where a committee of 
the regulatory agency presides over the 
hearing, it often uses an ALJ to make 
evidentiary rulings but otherwise decides 
the case entirely itself. These committee 
panels are generally dominated by per-
sons in the trade or profession of the 
accused. They are always volunteers. In 
the case of medical discipline, they are 
drawn from 250 physicians of various 
specialties from fourteen different region-
al panels scattered throughout the state. 
They sit on one or two such hearing 
panels per year at most. They may or 
may not practice in the particular special-
ty of the accused-most do not. 
Where local volunteer practitioners 
serve as hearing judges, they have no 
training in administrative law and little 
in law. They generally have never "judged" 
outside this single context. They do not 
know of the decisions of other similar 
panels or of appellate cases. But they 
make the critical decision: as the trier of 
fact, they make findings as to what hap-
pened and recommend discipline. 
Where an AU is assigned to perform 
this task without such a panel, a number 
of these deficiencies are remedied. But 
here the trier of fact has no expertise at 
all in the subject matter of what may be 
a technical case and no access to exper-
tise. In fact, the scope of practice of 
ALJs may be wide and may encompass 
cases ranging from removal of an alcohol 
license to a Structural Pest . Control 
Board case. 
After this initial hearing occurs, the 
matter is submitted as a "proposed de-
cision" to the regulatory body as a whole. 
This agency may then rewrite it. It may 
or may not hear oral argument. These 
agency governing boards, as with the 
hearing panels, include-and are often 
dominated by-those currently practicing 
the trade or profession of the accused, 
although not necessarily (or likely) in 
the particular practice specialty at issue 
in the case. 
After this process is completed, the 
case usually enters the courts for judicial 
review of the administrative adjudication. 
It is subject to writ of administrative 
mandamus review by one of several thou-
sand superior court judges. Since a 
"vested right" is at issue, this court ap-
plies what is called the "independent 
judgment" test for review. He/ she looks 
at the raw evidence anew and makes an 
independent evaluation. He/ she has no 
expertise in the subject matter at issue. 
Then the case goes to a court of 
appeal for review, and then by petition 
to the California Supreme Court. If there 
is a federal constitutional issue, petition 
to the U.S. Supreme Court is possible. 
Where contested by the accused, this 
process takes six to eight years to com-
plete. Discipline is finalized commonly 
over ten years from the time the initial 
events leading to it occurred. Further, 
the system has no reasonable means for 
interim remedy to protect the public. In 
cases where immediate action is warrant-
ed, the agency's only recourse is to obtain 
a temporary restraining order (TRO) 
and preliminary injunction from a su-
perior court judge. Because the superior 
courts see very few of these cases and 
lack the expertise to feel comfortable 
making a judgment about interim sus-
pension or even about temporary license 
restrictions to protect the public, very 
few are granted. Only three have been 
obtained over the past three years for 
physicians-where the potential harm is 
particularly egregious and the need for 
interim safeguards most urgent. Not one 
TRO has been obtained over the past 
year in the face of 4,500 complaints 
against physicians, 249 of whom had 
their privileges revoked by hospitals 
for medical incompetence endangering 
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the public. 
In addition to being ludicrously lengthy, 
the system is expensive. The agencies 
must pay for investigators (either their 
own or on an hourly basis from the 
Department of Consumer Affairs), tran-
scripts, Attorney General time, and ALJ 
time. One case can cost over $100,000. 
The average case through initial hearing 
costs over $20,000 out-of-pocket. Many 
agencies, particularly those which are 
small, literally cannot afford to discipline 
more than half a dozen practitioners per 
year, regardless of abuse. These agencies 
are limited in their budgets to the "special 
funding" of license renewal fees from 
their licensees. For agencies with a small 
number of licensees, this creates a very 
real impediment to discipline. 
The system also lacks the kind of 
professional independence appropriate for 
a serious police power decision to revoke 
a license. Those judging represent the 
"state" in the purest sense. That is, they 
are deciding to invoke the power of the 
state in the interests of the general public. 
Such a decision is not properly made by 
competitors or colleagues of the accused. 
Contrary to the imputations of their 
defenders, each of these trades and pro-
fessions is not a medieval guild of trades-
persons able to decide in cartel fashion 
who is in and who is out. The decision 
is made by a state agency. Expertise and 
information may well be offered on an 
advisory basis by those with a financial 
and emotional stake in the profession, 
but the decisionmaker on behalf of the 
state should represent the state's interest-
period. 
The system lacks the expertise for 
informed decisionmaking which is, ironic-
ally, its justification. The call for "peer 
review" rests on the false assumption 
that "only a doctor can judge a doctor" 
or "only a lawyer can judge a lawyer." 
In fact, most discipline cases do not 
involve any technical questions. Why 
does one have to be a doctor to judge 
the appropriate penalty for a physician 
who is defrauding Medi-Cal or commit-
ting sodomy on a child or dealing drugs? 
Most cases, in fact, fall into one of these 
latter categories. But where there may 
be a technical question involving exper-
tise, how does it help to then have the 
current system? Is the hearing panel or 
the agency board of tradespersons going 
to have expertise on point? How much 
does someone in OB-GYN know about 
neurosurgery? Does it really help to have 
an ear, nose, and throat doctor on a 
panel judging a technical radiology ques-
tion? Or is a little knowledge likely to be 
dangerous? How does it assure such ex-
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pertise to then have a generalist judge 
with no knowledge at all of the subject 
matter have the last word (i.e., writ of 
mandate independent judgment review)? 
Finally, the system lacks the one hall-
mark of any judicial system: consistency. 
Predictability of outcome creates consist-
ent expectations, enhances deterrence, 
and stimulates efficiency-creating settle-
ments. Attorneys are less likely to throw 
the dice if the end result can be antici-
pated. The current system has very little 
assurance of such consistency. The pool 
of persons making the initial findings is 
large and uncoordinated-not even know-
ing of each others' decisions. Judicial 
review from one of many superior court 
judges depends upon a stare decisis 
system of review by courts of appeal in 
six different districts, and is subject to 
final disposition by a Supreme Court 
with a workload which precludes realistic 
accommodation of inconsistencies (ex-
cept in extreme cases) between districts. 
In short, the system is a mess. No-
body would have purposefully designed 
it the way it is working. It simply evolved. 
There is a better way. Here is how it 
would work: 
(I) An ALJ who specializes in a major 
subject area and who has at least rudi-
mentary training in the terms of art of 
that subject matter would conduct the 
initial evidentiary hearing. 
(2) The ALJ would have available 
to him/ her a panel of leading experts in 
all subject areas and disciplines at issue. 
The ALJ could call on any such expert 
with relevant expertise to review evidence 
and offer testimony "on the record" and 
subject to cross-examination. Rather 
than being a "hired gun" expert for 
either side, this panel would be an ALJ 
resource. 
(3) The case would be appealed direct-
ly to a single designated panel of the 
court of appeal and would be sustained 
if supported by "substantial evidence" 
(the substantial evidence test). A single 
panel would hear all cases in a given 
subject matter (such as medical discipline 
cases), precluding conflicts between dis-
tricts and assuring efficiently produced 
consistency. 
(4) A discretionary petition to the 
Supreme Court would be available, as is 
currently the case. 
The entire process would be short-
ened from six to eight years to eighteen 
months. The quality of the proceeding 
would improve. Rather than asking four 
different tribunals (plus Supreme Court 
discretionary review) to make a low quali-
ty decision knowing that others will look 
at it, you would have two steps. But 
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those two steps have accountability, in-
dependence, and expertise. The current 
system has two steps by amateurs who 
know little about law, judging, or other 
decisions, followed by two steps by 
professionals who know little about the 
subject matter and have no access to 
expertise outside the hired experts and 
adversarial posturing which does not 
always serve finding the truth. 
And you would have a body of judges, 
the special administrative law judges, 
available to impose interim remedies 
after hearing to protect the public where 
warranted. They would have knowledge 
both of the law and the subject matter, 
with available expertise, awareness of 
each other's decisions, and independence 
to represent the public interest fairly. 
The current system is the result of 
unintentional evolution of administrative 
law and its review. The system we sug-
gest is now reflected to a large extent in 
the State Bar reforms of 1988 in SB 
1498 (Presley), and is now under consid-
eration for physicians in SB 1434 (Pres-
ley). It is a model deserving replication 
for other trades and for other states. 
Letters To The Editor: 
MWD Responds to 
Water Transfer Article 
June I, 1989 
Dear Editor: 
We found Jon Ferguson's water trans-
fer article, The First Major "Water 
Transfer": Opening the Floodgates, in 
your Winter 1989 issue quite informative. 
His review of related water law focuses 
needed attention on the institutional com-
plexities required to achieve a major 
water transfer. 
We especially appreciate his use of 
Metropolitan Water District's recently 
executed agreement with Imperial Irriga-
tion District as an important develop-
ment in extending the use of southern 
California's limited water supplies. 
However, the article's title is overly 
optimistic, and perhaps misleading. The 
water transfer which the article describes 
is in fact a water conservation agreement 
between junior and senior rights holders, ' 
rather than an "open market" water 
transfer. Indeed, one of the other junior 
rights holders is currently litigating the 
agreement's impact on its rights in 
Coachella Valley Water District v. 
Imperial Irrigation District, et al., No. 
890165B (IEG) (S.D. Cal. 1989). 
In the interest of developing a work-
able water transfer model, therefore, we 
believe it should be emphasized that 




does not constitute a water transfer as 
that term is commonly used. 
One-Of-A-Kind Transaction. In par-
ticular, the agreement reflects a unique 
institutional and physical arrangement 
that may not be readily replicable in 
other areas of California. More specific-
ally, the agreement provides funding for 
Imperial Valley water conservation pro-
grams that will enable Imperial to meet 
its water supply responsibilities with less 
Colorado River diversions than it would 
otherwise use. 
Under long-standing state and federal 
contracts, Metropolitan would then be 
able to increase its Colorado River di-
versions by the amount Imperial reduces 
its diversions. Those contracts fully allo-
cate all of California's Colorado River 
entitlement to specific agencies in a clear-
ly identified priority arrangement (Ari-
zona v. California (1963) 373 U.S. 546). 
Obviously this is an arrangement that 
differs significantly from an open market 
water transfer. 
Federal Characteristics. It is also 
important to emphasize that lmperial's 
Colorado River rights are not conven-
tional appropriative state water rights. 
As Mr. Ferguson indicates, the develop-
ment of the Colorado River has imposed 
some important federal characteristics 
on Colorado River rights. In return, the 
federal projects assure Imperial a much 
more reliable Colorado River supply 
than it originally had. 
The federal Colorado River Contract 
Program also relieves Imperial from any 
use-it-or-lose-it risks. On the other hand, 
it allows Imperial to divert only the 
amount of Colorado River water needed 
for reasonable beneficial use within its 
Imperial Valley service area. Any water 
Imperial cannot use in that manner must 
be left in the River for Metropolitan 
and other junior California rights hold-
ers (State Water Resources Control Board 
Decision 1600, at 10-18). 
The U.S. Supreme Court has express-
ly ruled that the federal Colorado River 
water contracts, rather than state law 
such as that administered by SWRCB, 
determines the allocation of California's 
Colorado River water (373 U.S. at 585-
90). Nevertheless, SWRCB has authority 
to determine whether Colorado River is 
used wastefully once it is diverted into 
California (Imperial Irrigation District 
v. SWRCB(1986) 186 Cal. App. 3d 1160). 
Consistent State Law. California law 
also parallels the federal law in other 
respects. In particular, it precludes any 
transfer of lmperial's water rights to 
areas outside Imperial Valley if that 
would injure junior users such as Metro-
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politan (Water Code sections 170 I, 1702, 
1706). Transferring Imperial water to 
third parties for use in other areas would 
obviously injure Metropolitan by reduc-
ing its rights to Colorado River flows 
that are not needed for reasonable bene-
ficial uses in the Imperial Valley. 
California's water transfer and conser-
vation statutes carefully preserve that 
protection for junior rights holders such 
as Metropolitan (Water Code sections 
1005, 1012). Water Code section 101 l(b) 
specifically conditions the sale or lease 
of conserved water on compliance with 
other "provisions of law," such as Water 
Code section 1706, and article X, section 
2 of the California Constitution. 
Furthermore, those statutes apply 
only to surplus water. Since California's 
Colorado River entitlement is fully allo-
cated, it does not include any surplus 
water. The federal contracts, in fact, 
authorize California rights holders to 
use nearly a million acre-feet more than 
California's basic entitlement (SWRCB 
Decision 1600, at II-13). Metropolitan's 
share of that entitlement is over 60% 
short of the amount of use specified in 
its Colorado River contract. Obviously, 
Metropolitan will need any Colorado 
River water that the Imperial Valley 
does not need (id. at 53). 
Prior Major Transfers. Conventional 
water transfers, involving much larger 
amounts of water, have been central to 
California's urban population for genera-
tions, although sometimes marked by 
environmental and other area-of-origin 
controversies. For example, the City of 
Los Angeles has been transferring water 
from the eastern Sierra for over half a 
century, while the San Francisco Bay 
area has been transferring water from 
the western Sierra for a similar period. 
While these may not be considered 
pure open market transactions under 
today's conventions, they certainly are 
major water transfers that have proven 
very beneficial to California over the years. 
We very much appreciate this oppor-
tunity to clarify these points and certain-
ly commend Mr. Ferguson's continuing 
search for workable and reasonable meth-
ods for increasing the efficiency of our 
limited water supply resources. 
Very truly yours, 
Fred Vendig 
General Counsel 
Victor E. Gleason 
Senior Deputy General Counsel 
The Metropolitan Water District 
of Southern California 
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